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Abstract  
Thesis: A bachelor thesis within Business Administration at The School of Business, 
Economics and Law at the University of Gothenburg, the Department of Accounting,  
spring semester 2015.  
 
Title: Family Firms and Disclosure Tone – A quantitative study on the impact of family 
ownership on disclosure tone 
 
Authors: Jacob Carlsson and Karin Sörensson  
Supervisors: Emmeli Runesson and Niuosha Samani  
 
Background: Qualitative disclosures in annual reports, i.e. disclosure narratives, such as the 
CEO-letter, are important complements to the quantitative aspects of corporate disclosure. 
How readers perceive the narrative information, and thereby how they perceive the firm’s 
performances and image, may influence investors’ business decisions. Since there are few or 
no explicit rules as to what narrative disclosures should cover and how it should be written, 
firms have the possibility to influence the readers perception through tone management. If a 
family holds a high degree of voting shares in a firm, it can obtain and maintain considerable 
control and may thereby also have the ability to influence disclosure practises.  
 
Purpose: The purpose of this study is to test whether there is a correlation between the degree 
of family ownership in terms of voting rights and the tone used in the disclosure narratives. 
Furthermore, the study seeks to test if having a family member as CEO and/or chairman of the 
board affects the tone used. By testing for these correlations, this thesis seeks to investigate if 
family ownership has an impact on the tone used in disclosure narratives and thereby tell if 
family firms are more or less inclined to use tone management. 
 
Delimitations: The scope of this study focuses on the annual reports of 100 companies noted 
on the Swedish stock exchange, Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. This thesis concerns the narrative 
parts of the annual reports, more specifically the CEO-letter. The annual reports studied are 
from the year of 2013 and published in Swedish.  
 
Methodology: This thesis takes on a quantitative approach. Tone in CEO-letters have been 
quantified through word counts based on positive and negative words occurring in a pre-set 
wordlist. The firms studied have been dichotomously segmented into family and non-family 
firms and further divided into two groups; (1) family firms where a member of the controlling 
family holds the position as CEO and/or chairman of the board, and (2) non-family firms or 
family firms without a family member as CEO and/or chairman. 
The hypotheses have been tested through statistical tests of differences and correlation.  
 
Findings and Conclusions: The empirical results indicate no statistically significant 
correlation between the degree of family ownership and tone in CEO-letters. However, the 
results suggest a tendency for firms that are considered family firms to present a slightly less 
positive tone than non-family firms do. Furthermore, when a member of a controlling family 
serves as CEO or chairman of the board, the tone used in the CEO-letter tends to decline 
further. Although the empirical evidence of the associations were not statically significant, a 
different definition of family firms or a larger sample may change the outcome of the tests 
and thus, further research is therefore necessary in order to make a general conclusion on the 
impact of family ownership on disclosure tone.  
  
Keywords: Disclosure tone, family firms, tone management, disclosure narratives, entrenchment
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1. Introduction  
This section presents the background of this bachelor thesis.  
The purpose of the thesis will be presented, followed by the delimitations of the study.  
In addition, the relevance of the study will be accounted for and an outline of the thesis will 
be provided.  
1.1 Background  
Corporate disclosure is a fundamental part of decision making in all markets; analysts base 
most of their analysis, forecasts and recommendations on information provided directly by the 
firms themselves, hence making corporate disclosure essential to analysts and by extension 
the stakeholders and their reactions to the market (Lang & Lundholm, 1996).   
 
In this thesis, we define corporate disclosure as companies sharing all relevant information 
that may influence stakeholders’ view on the company’s performance and, in extension, their 
decisions made based on the information given. Corporate disclosure comes in many forms; 
annual reports, interviews and press releases. What information is shared and how it is 
presented, hence the quality of the corporate disclosure, is of great importance for decisions 
such as whether investors should buy, hold or sell shares. Even though there are regulations to 
what minimum disclosure firms have to provide, there is little regulation on additional 
information and the narrative parts of annual reports (Lang & Lundholm 1996).  
 
For the financial reporting to be of use, and making investing as fair as possible, the 
information must be in accordance with the fundamental qualitative characteristics; that is the 
information shared must be relevant and faithfully represented (Marton et. al, 2012).  
In turn, for the narrative disclosures to be of use, it must faithfully represent the underlying 
quantitative information it is supposed to be a complement to.  
Nevertheless, although disclosure regulations provide some rules on what is to be disclosed in 
narratives, the wording on the disclosure is arbitrary (Henry, 2008).  
  
This brings us to the importance of tone in the information provided; as the old saying goes “it 
is not what you say it’s how you say it”. Tone regards the general affect perceived in 
communication, in other words the general feeling the reader perceives from the text, 
distinguished in positive or negative emotions (Henry, 2008).  
Tone affects how the recipients respond to the information given; the same information can be 
interpreted and acted on differently depending on the tone the information was given in.  
Accordingly, disclosure tone can be used as a tool by firms to influence perceptions and 
reactions of investors (Huang et. al, 2014). Given the impact of tone on investors’ reactions, 
firms may have incentives to use tone as a tool to either hype or depress the firm’s 
performance and image; that is, using an abnormal positive or negative tone in the 
information shared. The phenomenon of firms using a tone in their qualitative disclosure that 
is unequal to their underlying quantitative information is referred to as tone management 
(Huang et. al, 2014). Tone management is a form of impression management and constitutes 
an important field of research given its potential negative impact on disclosure quality, 
leading to misallocations of resources (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).   
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Tone in disclosure may vary among firms, but for different or unknown reasons. It is not 
known to what extent the structure of ownership has an impact on the disclosure tone.  
Since family firms generate 70-90% of global GDP annually, the potential influence of family 
ownership on disclosure is of importance (Family Firm Institute 2008). 
Given families’ impact on the economy, researchers may reach fallacious and/or insufficient 
conclusions by not accounting for the family dimension in accounting research (Prencipe et. 
al, 2014).  
 
In Sweden, there is a high concentration and a long tradition of firms having a concentrated 
ownership structure. This ownership concentration is often a consequence of firms being to a 
high degree family owned (from here on referred to as family firms) (Cronqvist & Nilsson, 
2003). An important aspect of this is that families can maintain control of a firm through 
owning dual class shares; holding a high degree of voting rights and a low degree of cash flow 
rights. Given their high degree of voting rights, families gain control and thus influence over 
the firm. Within family firms it is also common for family members to hold key positions 
such as CEO or chairman of the board, further enhancing the family’s control over the firm. 
Due to the family’s considerable influence, one can suppose that the family ownership might 
also have an impact on disclosure practises; what is disclosed and how it is presented 
(Samani, 2015; Cronqvist & Nilsson, 2003). These characteristics make the impact of family 
ownership an interesting and potentially important field of study.  
 
Previous studies have suggested that family firms differ in characteristics from non-family 
firms. These differences have been explained differently in various studies; some studies 
suggest that family firms are exposed to different kind of agency problems whilst other 
studies argue that the differences of family firms are due to a more stewardship-like behaviour 
occurring in these firms (Prencipe et. al, 2014). Therefore, the impact of family ownership on 
disclosure can be examined through agency theory and stewardship theory; both presented in 
the literature review (see section 2.3 & 2.4).  
 
In summary; families with a high degree of ownership in terms of voting rights can be 
assumed to enjoy a significant influence over the firm, which may be directed towards the 
firm’s disclosure practises. The explanation for whether this potential influence is put into 
action, and reflected in disclosure through tone management, may differ depending on the 
theory (agency or stewardship) applied.  
 
1.2 Research Purpose  
As mentioned above, the potential influence of family ownership on corporate disclosure may 
be an important aspect to accounting research.   
 
The purpose of this study is to test whether there is a correlation between the degree of 
family ownership in terms of voting rights and the tone used in the disclosure narratives. 
Furthermore, the study seeks to test if having a family member as CEO and/or chairman of 
the board affects the tone used. By testing for these correlations, this thesis seeks to 
investigate if family ownership has an impact on the tone used in disclosure narratives and 
thereby tell if family firms are more or less inclined to use tone management. 
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The thesis seeks to identify if there are differences in tone between firms with a high degree 
of family ownership and those with low, and furthermore, if having family members as CEO 
and/or chairman of the board affects the tone. If any differences exist, this thesis aims to 
provide possible explanations as to why this may be. By doing so, this thesis aims to create 
further awareness on the impact of family ownership on disclosure.  
1.3 Delimitations 
In order to make our study practicable, following delimitations have been decided:  
 
* Due to the tradition and high concentration of firms being family owned in Sweden, we 
have decided to focus our study on firms noted on the Swedish stock exchange. This also 
provides a distinctive delimitation of firms.  
 
* The sample size studied consists of 100 companies noted on the Swedish stock exchange, 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm AB. The companies are listed on either the large or mid-cap list.  
 
* The performance (e.g. earnings ratios) of the companies selected will not be taken into 
account in this study since this study does not intend to investigate all possible factors that 
may influence the tone used in narratives, only the potential impact of family ownership.  
 
* Although firms disclose information through several channels (“vehicles”) such as press 
releases, interviews and quarterly statements, we have decided to study the annual reports.  
 
* We have further narrowed our scope to study the CEO-letter within the annual reports since 
this is a descriptive narrative part where there might be incentives for the firm to influence the 
reader through linguistic choices.  
 
* The companies selected must have an annual report of the year 2013 published in Swedish. 
 
1.4 Relevance of the Study and Potential Contribution 
Previous research has been performed in our field of study. All of the components essential to 
our thesis have been studied previously, however separately or in other combinations than 
applied in this thesis. Impression management as a phenomenon has been studied (e.g. 
Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013) as well as tone and the management thereof (e.g. Huang et. 
al, 2014). Although the field of family firms and the impact of family ownership is relatively 
young and emerging, it has been a research area of interest since the 1980’s (Prencipe et. al, 
2014; Miller et. al, 2013).  
 
Despite the research mentioned above, our scope of study is unique. We have found no 
previous research on the specific correlation between family ownership and the occurrence of 
impression management (in terms of tone) in narrative disclosures.  
This makes our study a potentially important contribution to the aspect of family ownership 
impact. 
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1.5 Outline of Thesis  
The introduction will present the background of this bachelor thesis. The purpose of the 
thesis will be presented, followed by the delimitations of the study. In addition, the relevance 
of the study will be accounted for and an outline of the thesis will be provided. 
 
The literature review will present the existing theories, information and knowledge relevant 
to the scope of this thesis. First, the theory of impression management and its subordinate 
branch tone management is presented. Second, different approaches to define family firms are 
presented, followed by different theories and additional aspects relevant to explore family 
firms within our chosen scope. This section will provide a comprehensive view of the studied 
phenomenon and serve as basis for the subsequent analysis. 
 
The section hypotheses development will present the hypotheses developed from the research 
questions posed based on the aforementioned literature review. The hypotheses represent the 
expected associations of variables in the empirical study and constitute the base on which the 
empirical tests will be executed.    
 
The methodology will present the methods used throughout this thesis in order to fulfil its 
purpose. First, the research approach adopted is accounted for, followed by the research 
methods used to collect our sample, define family firms and family. Second, methods used to 
select a narrative and how to account for family members in key positions are presented. 
Finally, the method for quantifying tone and the statistical tests used for the empirical study 
are accounted for. The methods will be motivated and limitations will be accounted for. 
This section aims to provide a comprehensive view of how the research of this thesis has been 
executed and enable the reader to assess the validity and reliability of the study. 
 
The section of empirical study and results will account for the statistical tests executed and 
the results derived from them. General descriptive statistics will be accounted for, and the 
results of tests conducted to determine differences and investigate correlations will be 
presented. The findings in this section will be used in the subsequent analysis. 
 
The analysis and discussion will provide a discussion on the findings from the empirical 
study with regards to the research purpose. The results from the statistical tests will be put 
together with the existing information accounted for in the literature review in order to 
validate or reject the hypotheses set up for this study.  
 
The section of concluding remarks will present the conclusions drawn from the empirical 
results and the analysis. Through the conclusions, the hypotheses will be validated or rejected 
and the research questions and purpose will be answered. Additionally, suggestions for further 
research will be presented. The suggestions are based on potential limitations of this study and 
potentially interesting areas within the field.   
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2. Literature Review  
This section presents the existing theories, information and knowledge relevant to the scope of 
this thesis. First, the theory of impression management and its subordinate branch tone 
management is presented. Second, different approaches to define family firms are presented, 
followed by different theories and additional aspects relevant to explore family firms within 
our chosen scope. This section will provide a comprehensive view of the studied phenomenon 
and serve as a basis for the subsequent analysis. 
2.1 Impression Management 
According to the Oxford dictionary of media and communication impression management is 
defined as “the various ways in which people seek to influence the impressions formed by 
others”.  Although widely used in psychological theories and studies on individuals, it can be 
interpreted into organisations (Oxford University Press, 2011). Put in a corporate context, 
impression management refers to organisations intentionally influencing their audience 
(stakeholders) through the construction of a certain impression in disclosure. The construction 
of impression may consist of firms either obfuscating negative news and performances by the 
firm in order to alter the reader’s impression of it or, intensifying statements on positive 
outcomes in order to hype it. The impression constructed by the firm may lead stakeholders to 
fallacious decisions and misallocation of resources (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).  
 
Impression management is carried out through different “vehicles” such as annual reports, 
press releases and conference calls. Accounting narratives are often the target of impression 
management since there are no explicit rules for how to word what is being disclosed, making 
the construction thereof easier to shape (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).    
 
According to Brennan & Merkl-Davis (2013) impression management in the field of 
accounting research (thus in a corporate context) can be differentiated into 4 main 
perspectives:  
(i) Economical, (ii) psychological, (iii) sociological, and (iv)critical.  
Although considered to be a rather narrow view of impression management, the economical 
and psychological perspective are dominating the field and are also the ones of greatest 
importance to this study. These two perspectives take in consideration a narrower scope of 
stakeholders influenced by the companies’ impression management (Brennan & Merkl-Davis, 
2013). The stakeholders considered (the organizational audiences) within these two prominent 
perspectives are investors, lenders and financial intermediaries. Whereas non-financial 
stakeholders and the socio-political contexts are ignored within the economical and 
psychological perspective, these wider social and political aspects are accounted for within 
the sociological and critical perspectives (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).  
 
Depending on the perspective adopted, the impression management manifests itself in 
different forms; reporting bias, self-serving bias, symbolic management/decoupling and 
ideological bias (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Since only two of the four perspectives are 
essential to this study, only the characteristics of these two (economical and psychological) 
will be accounted for below:  
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(i) The Economical Perspective (reporting bias) 
The economical perspective has an investment approach and is first and foremost concerned 
with managing shareholders’ perceptions of the financial performance.  
Impression management in an economical perspective is conceptualized through reporting 
bias arising from information asymmetries, thus being strongly linked with agency theory (see 
section 2.3) and its assumptions. Due to the agency related opportunistic behaviour, managers 
manipulate the impression given in disclosure through valence and tone; emphasising positive 
and obfuscating negative performances (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).  
Godfrey et. al, (2003:96) define reporting bias as “selecting the information to display and 
presenting that information in a manner that is intended to distort readers’ perceptions of 
corporate achievements”.  
 
(ii) The Psychological Perspective (self-serving bias) 
Unlike the economical perspective, the psychological perspective takes social relations into 
consideration in the view of managers. Managers are concerned with others’ evaluation of 
their performance and therefor use self-serving bias; seeking to win awards and avoid 
sanctions for actions they have undertaken (Frink & Ferris, 1998). Self-serving bias manifests 
itself through managers claiming responsibility for good performances and denying it for bad, 
blaming failures on external factors, such as political circumstances, instead (Aerts & Cheng, 
2011). 
 
When adopting the economical and psychological perspective, there are several categories of 
analysis. Various communication choices may be used to manage impressions in narrative 
parts of corporate reports (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).  
In disclosure narratives, such as the CEO-letter, this may be done by the use of tone.  
Tone in disclosure narratives does not only refer to the words chosen (i.e. positive or negative) 
but also the content chosen (Henry, 2008).  
However, tone is just one of several possible ways to practise impression management in 
narrative accounting. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) list seven communication choices to 
implement impression management. Out of these seven, the thematic manipulation is the one 
of interest for this study, which is why the other six choices are only mentioned and not 
further explored below: 
 
(1) Thematic manipulation refers to the understating of bad or overstating of good news in the 
disclosure narratives in terms of tone; themes emphasised and words chosen to describe it. 
The phenomenon of firms using a tone in their qualitative disclosure that does not faithfully 
represent their quantitative information is referred to as tone management (Huang et. al, 
2014). Using tone to manage the impression of narratives is essential to this study and 
therefore presented further in section 2.1.1.  
 
The other communication choices for implementing impression management are: 
(2) Reading ease manipulation, (3) Rhetorical manipulation, (4) Visual and structural 
manipulation, (5) Performance comparison, (6) Choice of earnings number (selectivity)  
and (7) Attribution. 
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2.1.1 Tone Management and Disclosure Tone  
One crucial tool to influence readers’ impressions of narrative parts of annual reports is by the 
use of tone. Tone is classified as a form of thematic manipulation (see section 2.1; 
communication choice 1) in the field of impression management; making tone management a 
subordinate branch of impression management theory (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
Tone regards the general affect perceived in communication, in other words the general 
feeling the reader perceives from the text distinguished in positive or negative emotions 
(Henry, 2008). Accordingly, tone is essential to how a message is perceived by the readers 
and how they respond to it; “it’s not what you say, it’s how you say it” (Huang et. al, 2014). 
The narrative parts are supposed to function as a complement to the information disclosed in 
the quantitative parts of annual reports; thereby helping the reader to process and encode the 
information given, and possibly contributing with further information in order to paint the full 
picture. In order to get that picture to faithfully represent the underlying reality, it is important 
that the narrative disclosure actually is in congruence with the underlying fundamentals and 
does not seek to skew it in a positive nor negative direction. 
When tone is used to make the qualitative disclosure unequal to the underlying quantitative 
information to which it refers, it is known as tone management (Huang et. al, 2014).  
 
The nature of narrative disclosure can be seen as dual. It is promotional in the sense that the 
firm’s perceived image can be influenced by the tone chosen, but can also be seen as 
informational, giving the managers an opportunity to improve the reader’s understanding 
(Henry, 2008; Huang et. al 2014). The disclosure narratives constitute an unregulated window 
since there are no or few (depending on which narrative) explicit rules regarding what is to be 
disclosed and how. This poses an opportunity for the firm to affect readers through tone 
management, since words are much more elastic than numbers and harder to regulate (Huang 
et. al, 2014; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Henry, 2008). Management of tone regards the words 
as well as the content chosen. By using positive words to describe a performance, as well as 
choosing to focus disclosure to performances with positive outcomes, an overall positive tone 
can be achieved (Henry, 2008).  
 
As previously mentioned, the words chosen affect the tone and thereby the reader’s 
impression of the text. Henry (2008) has made a classification of words frequently used in 
financial domains, denoting them as either positive or negative. These words have been put 
together in a wordlist (see Appendix 1) custom made for financial domains that is used as a 
tool to analyse if texts are excessively positive or negative. Positive wording can be used to 
hype the firm’s performance and image whilst negative wording on the contrary can be used 
to depress it (Li, 2008). There are several positive/negative wordlists available for measuring 
tone in disclosure narratives for example Loughran & McDonald (2011). It should be noted, 
however, that these wordlists are all adapted to a financial context. In order to analyse the 
tone perceived by individuals in a non-financial context, general wordlists may be more 
suitable (Rogers et. al, 2011).   
 
The occurrence of an optimistic tone in disclosure narratives have been proven to correlate 
with firm performance (Henry, 2008). Thus, the mere presence of positive words in 
accounting narratives does not necessarily indicate tone management. Based on this, it has 
been argued that research should distinguish normal positive tone from abnormal, in order to 
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not jump to fallacious conclusions (Rogers et. al 2011).  
 
It should be noted that tone to some extent is associated with risk, both in terms of litigation 
and credibility (Rogers et. al, 2011; Rahman, 2012). The results provided by Rogers et. al 
(2011) in the article “Disclosure tone and shareholder litigation” show that optimistic 
language is a greater target for litigation. They find that the statement quotes leading to 
shareholder litigation are the ones that are the most optimistic. Accordingly, they suggest that 
managers therefore can reduce litigation risk by dampening the tone through cutting back on 
the use of positive language and optimistic statements in disclosure narratives (Rogers et. al 
2011). Furthermore, if tone management is applied in accounting narratives and stakeholders 
recognize that they have been misled, the firm’s image and reputation can suffer severe 
damages (Rahman, 2012).  
 
Due to the narrative disclosure being an easy target for tone management and subject to 
interpretation, there is an ongoing debate as to whether qualitative statements should be 
considered as a material statement of fact at all. Because of its very nature it has been 
questioned whether the narrative parts instead should be considered as fully promotional 
rather than informational (Rogers et. al, 2011).  
 
2.2 Definition of Family Firms  
Ever since the first article on family firms was published, various definitions of what 
constitutes a family firm have been argued. To this day, the debate continues and researchers 
have not yet settled on a “one best way” to define a family firm. The family’s involvement in 
the firm has been a key factor in the search for the definition of family firms. Two main 
approaches to defining family firms have arisen from previous research; the involvement 
approach and the essence approach (Prencipe et. al, 2014). 
 
The involvement approach stresses the family’s involvement through their ability to impact 
the firm’s direct goals, strategies and behaviours (Miller et. al, 2013).    
To determine the family’s involvement, proxies such as degree of family ownership, family 
involvement in management or family involvement in the governance of the firm are used 
(Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013).  
 
The alternative approach for identifying family firms is the essence approach, which is even 
further concerned with the impact family involvement has on shaping the firm. The approach 
recognizes family involvement as a requirement, but does not, unlike the involvement 
approach, find the mere presence of family involvement sufficient to distinguish family firms 
from non-family firms. Even if two firms have the same degree of family involvement, the 
effects from it may differ between them in terms of vision, culture, values, goals and 
behaviours (Deephouse & Jaskiewicz, 2013).    
 
Up until now, it has been, and still is, common to distinguish family firms from non-family 
firms through the use of dichotomous segmentations.  
With a dichotomous segmentation, a clear distinction is made to separate family firms from 
non-family firms based on a specific criteria or proxy (Prencipe et. al, 2014). 
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According to Prencipe et. al (2014) examples of these segmentation criteria may be the role of 
family in management/strategic control, family members involvement in every day operations 
or family ownership. Each of these examples are further conceptualized differently in 
different definitions of family firms. For instance, if “family ownership” serves as a criteria 
for dichotomous segmentation, this may be defined in several alternative ways; the family as 
the largest owner, a certain degree of family ownership over all, or the family owning the 
majority of voting shares.  
 
However, it has been argued that a family doesn’t need to own the majority of voting shares 
(>50%) in order to establish control over the company. Faccio and Lang (2002) argue that a 
family will enjoy sufficient control with a possession of 20% of the voting shares. Due to the 
fact that minority shareholders rarely all practise their voting rights simultaneously, a family 
with a 20% possession will gain and retain significant control over the company and its 
practises.  
 
Although criticism has been directed towards dichotomous approaches; arguing that it is a 
segmentation based on far too many generalizations since family firms are very 
heterogeneous, dichotomous segmentations are still frequently used in empirical studies 
(Prencipe et. al, 2014). The alternative to the dichotomous segmentation of firms into family 
and non-family would be to determine their level of family influence according to a 
continuous scale. An example of this would be the “Family Power Experience Culture Scale” 
(F-PEC scale). The scale provides a score for each dimension, adding up to a measure of 
family influence (Astrachan et. al, 2002). 
 
A further implication when defining family firms is what constitutes a “family” in this 
specific context. The definition provided by Faccio and Lang (2002) states that a family is:  
“A family (including an individual) or a firm that is unlisted on any stock exchange.” They 
account for unlisted firms as family due to the fact that unlisted firms usually are closely held 
by a family, making it family control by extension (Faccio & Lang, 2002). This definition 
serves as a basis for the definition of family firms used in this thesis, but with a minor 
alteration (see section 4.2.2). 
 
The impact family ownership has on disclosure can be examined through agency theory and 
stewardship theory. The characteristics of family firms differ from those in non-family firms 
due to the presence of interaction and integration between family life and business life.  
These conditions make it somewhat unclear as to which of the theoretical frameworks (agency 
or stewardship) should be applied when exploring the impact of family ownership 
(Habbershon & Williams, 1999).  
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2.3 Agency Theory  
The agency theory was developed by Jensen & Meckling in 1976. The theory focuses on the 
relationships between principals and agents. They define the agency relationship as "a 
contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the 
agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, pp. 308). 
An example of this kind of relationship is an employer-employee situation, where the 
employer is the principal, and the employee is the agent. The employee is thereby employed 
with the purpose of carrying out the goals set by the employer. Another example of this 
relationship is when a CEO is appointed by the board of directors to lead a company on behalf 
of the shareholders. 
 
A fundamental point of view within agency theory is that information asymmetry exists 
between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). Listed companies today may have 
multiple owners who have contributed with capital when they have bought stock, and these 
owners might in turn own shares in several different companies. All of these companies have 
a CEO, who of course has more information than any external shareholder in respect of the 
company. Certainly, it is difficult for any external shareholder to amass the same amount of 
information that the CEO has about the company, thus leading to information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Agency theory argues an individualistic organisational culture, where both the principal and 
the agent are assumed to be acting with self-interest and seeking ways to maximize their own 
utilities, without any regards to personal relationships (Davis et. al, 1997; Triandis, 1995). 
When the self-interest causes the goal of the agent to differ from the goal set by the principal, 
an agency conflict arises. Accordingly, a prominent problem that the theory addresses is the 
incongruence of the principal’s and the agent’s goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). To mitigate the 
conflicts of interest, measures must be taken by the principal to motivate the agent to align its 
objectives with the principal’s as much as possible. Agency theory argues that motivation is 
driven by extrinsic factors such as monetary and/or tangible rewards (Davis et. al, 1997).  
 
There are two types of agency conflicts (also known as agency problems).  
Type I is concerned with the incongruence of goals and interests between shareholders and 
managers and stems from the separation of ownership and management, causing opportunistic 
behaviour by the agent. This is referred to as the alignment problem (Prencipe et. al, 2014). 
The idea is further based on the presumption that the agents will act with self interest in the 
sense that they are presumed to be individualistic and opportunistic. Agents will act according 
to their own self-interest and towards their own goals instead of acting in the way which is 
intended, that is, in the direction and towards the goals that the principal actually hired the 
person for. Hence, the problem that arises is a goal incongruence between the principal and 
the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Agency problems of type II refer to conflict of interest among owners; that is, a principal-
principal agency problem arises (Prencipe et. al, 2014). The conflict of interest between 
shareholders arises because of the possibility for the controlling shareholders to take actions 
in a self-serving purpose, leaving the other shareholders’ utility affected negatively (Gilson & 
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Gordon, 2003). This second type of agency problem is also known as entrenchment and refers 
to corporate resources being misallocated to benefit controlling shareholders at the expense of 
the minority shareholder (Morck et. al, 2005; Ali et. al, 2007).  
The entrenchment effect arises from large shareholding (Claessens et. al, 2002).  
 
Jensen & Meckling and Stulz argue two sides of the occurrence of entrenchment. According 
to Jensen & Meckling (1976), large shareholders have less incentive to take actions for private 
benefits of control, while Stulz (1988) states that the large shareholders have more incentive 
to take such actions, since they are the ones with the freedom to do so, due to their higher 
degree of control. Type of agency problems differ in family firms from those in non-family 
firms (Ali et. al 2007), which will be discussed further under section 2.5. 
 
2.4 Stewardship Theory  
Researchers in psychology and sociology have over the years directed criticism towards the 
underlying assumptions of man in the principal-agent theory. Researchers argue that the 
assumption of man as a self-serving, opportunistic and rational being, ultimately seeking to 
maximize individual utility, is an unrealistic simplification of the complex nature of man that 
doesn’t take social aspects under consideration (Davis et. al, 1997). Accordingly, it has been 
argued that the principal-agent theory is somewhat limited in understanding the actions and 
behaviour of man (Jensen & Meckling 1994).  
 
Stewardship theory, with roots in psychology and sociology, was developed to further explain 
human behaviour beyond the strict economic perspective the principal-agent theory offers 
(Davis et. al, 1997). Stewardship theory argues a collectivistic organisational culture, where 
managers (i.e. stewards) are viewed as collectively oriented beings first and foremost 
concerned with acting in the best interest of the organization and by doing so, in the best 
interest of the principal (Davis et. al, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Stewards do not strive 
to achieve individual objectives to maximize personal utility; instead their objectives are 
aligned with the principal’s interest and when these are fulfilled, so is the steward’s personal 
utility. Accordingly, a corporate behaviour, and fulfilling the organisational objectives such as 
sales growth, is of greater utility to the steward than self-serving behaviours such as described 
in the principal-agent theory above (Davis et al 1997). The stewardship theory argues a 
natural alignment between the steward’s and the principal’s objectives due to the steward 
being motivated by higher-level intrinsic factors, such as organisational affiliation, autonomy, 
self-actualizing and feelings of purpose (Prencipe et. al 2014; Davis et. al, 1997). However, as 
committed to the organisation as the stewards may be, they do of course have a personal 
agenda in that they have personal needs that have to be met, like having an income. The 
essential difference from the principal-agent theory is in the way these needs are met; the 
steward believes that by working towards the organisational objectives and improving the 
performance of the same, their personal needs will be met and they don’t have to engage in 
actions harmful to the principal to achieve utility of their own (Davis et al 1997). 
 
Stewardship relationships tend to arise among parties that share a social context, such as a 
significant interdependence and interaction among each other, and similar social networks 
where stable relationships occur (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998).  
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2.5 Agency and Stewardship Theory within Family Firms 
In family firms there is a substantial presence of non-economic factors, such as emotional 
attachment, that does not exist in non-family firms. This strong attachment, for example 
through love and loyalty, tends to infuse the business and causes family members to identify 
themselves with the organisation and its objectives (Gomez-Mejia et. al, 2011).  
Given the importance of emotions such as loyalty, caring and pride within the family, family 
members are highly emotionally invested in family firm matters (Klein et. al, 2005). Further, 
family members have a desire from birth to be recognized for their actions within the family 
firm, indicating a stronger emotional attachment compared to non-family members (Berrone 
et. al 2010). Regards for feelings and harmony within the group, as well as identifying with 
the organisation (which in some cases even bear the family name) are collective 
characteristics. This indicates that the stewardship theory would be a suitable framework 
when studying family firms. Furthermore, stewardship theory has been argued to suit family 
firms well given the traits of stable relationships, strong interaction and interdependence 
typically occurring in family firms (Bourdieu 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998).  
 
Continuity, community and connection are three main dimensions of stewardship within 
family firms identified by Miller et. al (2008). The dimension of continuity has to do with the 
non-economic strive to build and maintain long-term relationships, establish the company’s 
development and survival, and ensure the possibility of passing it on to future generations 
(Miller et. al, 2008). The creation of a corporate culture characterized by collectivism is 
referred to as community. Connection is the aspect which refers to the tendency of family 
firms building strong, long term relationships with external stakeholders (Miller et. al, 2008). 
 
Given the circumstances mentioned above, it would seem suitable to apply a stewardship 
approach to family firms. However, all family firms do not act the same; situational and 
psychological factors of the particular firm and the members thereof does not necessarily have 
to be in accordance with stewardship traits. Therefore, agency behaviour can still arise in 
family firms, making the agency theory more suitable (Davis et. al, 1997).  
Agency problems within family firms, however, differ from those in non-family firms. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that, due to the family firms’ increased ability to monitor 
managers, agency problem of type I are evaded. However, although agency problems related 
to the separation of ownership and management may be less severe in family firms, agency 
problems of type II are all the more present (Ali et. al, 2007).  
 
Ali et. al (2007) conclude that the differences in type and severity of agency problems, may 
give rise to differences in disclosure practices between family and non-family firms.  
Factors argued to contribute to the mitigation of agency problem type I in family firms are 
first and foremost related to the fact that ownership and management is not separated to the 
same extent in family firms as in non-family firms. Families tend to hold a concentrated 
position of equity and entrench themselves by possessing controlling positions (Ali et el 
2007). On this note, families have good knowledge and insight in the managerial and 
operational aspects of the firm, which increases control over management (Anderson & Reeb, 
2003). Moreover, since family firms tend to have more severe conflict of interest between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders (type II), families may have incentives to reduce 
transparency and hence reduce disclosure when it comes to corporate governance practises. 
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The underlying motive is to simplify serving private benefits, such as getting family members 
in controlling positions, without the interference of small shareholder (Ali et. al, 2007).  
Due to their extensive voting rights, families with a high degree of ownership may possess 
control over the company and use this to engage in seeking private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders’ utility. This may be carried out by managerial entrenchment (Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997) or freezing out minority shareholders (Gilson & Gordon, 2003).  
If possessing a high degree of voting rights, families have an influence over the firm’s 
assignments of key positions, such as CEO or chairman of the board. By putting their votes on 
family members or a person they know will act in accordance with the family’s wishes, the 
family entrenches itself and further enhances its control.  
 
Given their huge impact on who gets appointed for these positions, the family can be assumed 
to have a closer relationship to these positions than minority shareholders do. In accordance 
with that assumption, this personal relationship between shareholders and the people in key 
positions can be assumed to be absent in non-family firms.  
In extension, if the family influences who holds the key positions, they may also influence the 
disclosure provided by these positions. For example, if the CEO is a family member, or a 
person strongly influenced by the family, the family’s impact on tone in the CEO-letter is 
clear. Furthermore, if a family member is chairman of the board, the family is provided with a 
deeper insight in the firm. This reduces the information asymmetry that might otherwise exist 
between the family and the firm, providing the family with the upper hand compared to the 
other shareholders. The insight provided by a family member being chairman might also 
influence the work of the CEO, giving the family an opportunity to indirectly influence the 
tone in disclosures made by the CEO.  
 
As presented in this section, both agency and stewardship theory can be successfully applied 
when studying family firms, depending on the circumstances. Prencipe et. al (2014) suggest 
that family firms may be better understood by using a combination of the two.  
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3. Hypotheses Development and Research Questions 
This section will present the hypotheses developed from the research questions posed based 
on the aforementioned literature review. The hypotheses represent the expected associations 
of variables in the empirical study and constitute the base on which the empirical tests will be 
executed. 
Based on the existing knowledge presented in the literature review, following research 
questions have been identified: 
  
* Is there a difference in tone (words chosen and their frequency) used in the CEO-letters of 
annual reports by family firms versus non-family firms?  
* If a family member holds the position of CEO or chairman of the board; does this influence 
the tone used?  
* Can agency or stewardship theory provide possible explanations for these possible 
differences?  
 
In order to answer these questions, and thereby achieve the purpose of the thesis, following 
hypotheses will be tested:  
 
?? There is a correlation between the tone used in CEO-letters and the degree of family 
ownership in the firm (family firms versus non-family firms).  
 
?? If a firm is considered a family firm, and has a family member as CEO and/or chairman of 
the board, they will present a more positive tone in the CEO-letter than non-family firms and 
family firms without family CEO and/or chairman of the board do.   
 
The first hypothesis aims to test the potential difference in tone depending on whether the 
firm in question is considered a family or non-family firm.  
The second hypothesis was developed to further investigate family’s potential impact on tone. 
It seeks to establish whether entrenchment is carried out by appointing family members to 
controlling positions and further affect the tone used. Given entrenchment effects, controlling 
families have the freedom to use tone management and therefore, we expect the association 
between tone and family firms having a family member as CEO/chairman to be positive.  
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4. Methodology  
This section presents the methods used throughout this thesis in order to fulfil its purpose. 
First, the research approach adopted is accounted for, followed by the research methods used 
to collect our sample, define family firms and family. Second, methods used to select a 
narrative and how to account for family members in key positions are presented. Finally, the 
method for quantifying tone and the statistical tests used for the empirical study are 
accounted for. The methods will be motivated and limitations will be accounted for. 
This section aims to provide a comprehensive view of how the research of this thesis has been 
executed and enable the reader to assess the validity and reliability of the study. 
4.1 Research Approach  
The purpose of this bachelor thesis is to investigate whether there are correlations between 
tone and different aspects family ownership. In order to achieve this purpose and establish 
these potential correlations, a quantitative methodology has been used. 
Furthermore, this study takes on a deductive approach since the impact of family ownership 
on disclosures is investigated from a base of previous studies and theories in order to validate 
or reject our hypotheses.   
 
4.2 Research Methods 
This study was initialized with the retrieving and reading of articles within our chosen field. 
These articles provided us with key words which were used to find related articles and books.  
Some of the key words used were tone management, tone, obfuscation, disclosure and family 
firm. This literature review helped us grasp our chosen field of study and broadened our 
knowledge on the matter, before proceeding with the study in accordance with the following 
sections.  
 
4.2.1 The Sample  
The sample of this study consists of 100 companies noted on the Swedish stock exchange; 
Nasdaq OMX Stockholm. We wanted the sample to consist of as many large cap noted 
companies as possible. However, since the large cap list does not consist of 100 companies 
and not all of the companies noted on the large cap list have annual reports published in 
Swedish (which is one of the delimitations of this study), the sample also consists of mid cap 
noted companies in order to get a sufficient sample size. The companies selected from the mid 
cap list are those with the highest turnover on stocks on the day we collected our sample, 
which was in April 2015, and has an annual report published in Swedish. It should be noted 
that the turnover on stocks may vary from day to day. However, although their relative 
position may change, it is realistic to assume that the companies at the top of the list will not 
differ significantly in the near future. By selecting companies from the large cap list and the 
ones with the highest stock turnover from the mid cap list, the study focuses on the companies 
with the most significant stocks and hence, this thesis provides a shareholder perspective. In 
total, our sample consist of 61 companies noted on the large cap list and 39 companies noted 
on the mid cap list. The full sample is listed in Appendix 4.   
 
In the sample list, dual shares have been excluded in order for each company to only be 
represented once in the sample. 
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The sample size of 100 companies was decided on because it was considered large enough to 
provide a significant result, but small enough to make the study practicable within our given 
timeframe. The annual reports studied have been retrieved from the companies’ websites 
respectively.  
 
Swedish companies were chosen because of the high concentration and long tradition of firms 
having a concentrated ownership structure in Sweden. This concentrated ownership is often 
attributable to families, making Swedish companies a particularly interesting population when 
studying the impact of family ownership.  
 
4.2.2 Defining Family Firms 
An essential variable for the study is the degree of family ownership; that is what constitutes a 
family firm. Prior studies have proposed various definitions. 
For this particular thesis, a dichotomous segmentation was applied in order to create two 
clearly distinguished artificial groups of firms; family firms (group 1) and non-family firms 
(group 2). The degree of family ownership in terms of voting rights served as the criteria 
which divided the firms studied into the two groups. Based on an involvement approach, we 
made the assumption that with a higher degree of family ownership comes greater power over 
company actions, goals and strategies (Prencipe et. al, 2014).  
Accordingly, with this power, families have the possibility to influence disclosure practises, 
making family ownership a suitable criteria for this study.  
 
We decided to set our threshold to 20% of voting rights since this, according to Faccio & 
Lang (2002), is sufficient to establish and retain control and hence have a possible impact on 
disclosure practices. Once this threshold was determined, we were able to define family firms 
through a dichotomous segmentation; those where a family is the largest shareholder and 
holds 20% or more of the voting shares are considered family firms, and those under a 20% 
family possession are considered non-family firms.  
Thus, in this thesis, a family firm is defined as a firm where a family (see definition in section 
4.2.2.1 below) is the largest owner in terms of voting rights, and holds 20% or more of the 
voting rights.  
 
The degree of family ownership (% voting rights) was retrieved from the online stock broker 
Avanza Bank Holding AB (Avanza, 2015). The largest shareholder of each firm, and their 
voting shares, are presented in Appendix 4. Appendix 4 also accounts for which group each 
firm was assigned to. 
 
4.2.2.1 Defining Family 
When using family ownership as a segmentation criteria to define family firms, one must also 
define what constitutes a family in this context. In this thesis, ownership was considered to be 
within a family if it was held by an individual, several members of the same family or a firm 
controlled by an individual or family.  
If a company was owned by another firm, an investment company or a foundation, it was still 
considered a family firm if a family was the largest owner and held at least 20% of the voting 
rights in that firm or foundation. A prominent example of this is Assa Abloy where the 
investment company Latour has 29,4% of the voting rights. In turn, since the family of Gustaf 
Douglas holds 79,7% of Latour, Assa Abloy is considered family owned. 
Our definition of family is in accordance with the one provided by Faccio and Lang (2002) 
with the minor alteration that also listed firms can be considered family owners, if controlled 
by a family.  
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4.2.3 Selecting a Narrative Part of the Annual Reports  
Out of this sample of 100 companies, the annual reports of 2013 were studied. 
Since this thesis seeks to investigate tone, the parts of annual reports relevant to the scope are 
the narrative parts. Further, the narrative parts studied have been narrowed down to the CEO-
letter. We chose to focus the scope on this section based on the assumption that this part is an 
easy target for impression management (i.e. tone management) due to the lack of explicit 
regulation on how it should be written. Further, in firms controlled by families the key 
positions, such as CEO, may be influenced by the family. The family has the power to appoint 
a family member as CEO or a CEO that will act in accordance with the family’s wishes. This 
makes the CEO-letter a forum where family ownership impact might shine through. Even 
though the CEO-letter is known to serve a somewhat promotional purpose, it is an important 
communication channel to the shareholders where the CEO writes about the company’s 
performance and situation. Although the letter is written in a very freely manner, it is based 
on the underlying reality that is covered in the rest of the annual report, making it an 
important reflection on the firm’s actions and performance. 
 
Not all annual reports presented a section referred to as CEO-letter, but all firms did have a 
narrative part written by the CEO where important events during the year and prospects were 
commented on, which we considered to be equivalent. Although there are no explicit rules for 
what the CEO-letter should disclose, it is written in a comparable manner; accounting for 
similar areas. The CEO-letter is also a suitable narrative for the scope of this thesis in regard 
to length.1  
 
4.2.4 Family Members in Key Positions 
As mentioned above, key positions may be influenced by the family. On that note, it was also 
of interest to investigate if there was a difference in tone between firms where there was a 
family member holding an active controlling position, and firms (both family and non-family 
firms) where there was not. In this thesis, key positions were defined as CEO or chairman of 
the board. This definition was motivated by the following:  
The CEO is a given key position due to its extensive knowledge and control over the firm’s 
actions and performances. Further, the CEO is the author of the CEO-letter and hence controls 
what is disclosed therein and in what tone it is presented.  
The chairman of the board is the most influential person on the board given the power of the 
casting vote. This gives the chairman the final say on board matters, such as appointing the 
CEO. In extension, if the chairman is a family member, this also means that the family gets 
the final say. The chairman can be assumed to have insight in, and the ability to influence, 
firm matters and the work of the CEO, and thereby the possibility to influence what is 
disclosed in the CEO-letter. On that note, family members serving as board members, not 
holding the chairman position, were not deemed to hold the same power as the chairman, and 
was therefore not considered to hold key positions in this study.  
 
In order to determine if a family member held a key position in this study, the CEO and 
chairman of the board for each of the firms previously defined as family firms were looked 
up. Two artificial groups were constructed; (1) firms where the CEO or chairman of the board 
                                                              
1 The alternative choice of disclosure narrative was the Swedish equivalent to the MD&A 
(förvaltningsberättelse). Its extensiveness would have made it difficult to ascertain the contextual correctness 
of the words used, making it less suitable for our scope. The MD&As were also assessed less comparable due to 
the difference in content between firms; it was difficult to find sections equivalent to each other. Further, the 
MD&As tend to be written in very different forms; some firms present the content in short paragraphs rather 
than a narrative text, making it difficult to establish and compare tone. 
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is related to the controlling family and (2) firms where there is no controlling family or where 
the CEO/chairman is not related to the controlling family.  
 
First, firms were distinguished to either have a controlling family (being a family firm) or not. 
Second, if there was a controlling family present, it was established whether the CEO or 
chairman of the board was related to that family. In order to establish whether they were 
related or not, family names were used. If the CEO and/or the chairman of the board shared 
the same family name as the family who was the largest owner and held at least 20% of the 
voting rights, they were considered to be related.  
 
The family names of the CEO and the chairman of the board were retrieved from the annual 
reports studied. Whether there was a controlling family and the name of that family was, as 
previously stated, retrieved from Avanza Bank Holding AB (Avanza, 2015). 
In cases where the largest owner was a company and the owners of that company were not 
available on Avanza, each company’s ownership structure was further examined through their 
websites in order to establish if it was to be considered a family firm and if so, the name of the 
controlling family. Whether a firm had a family member as CEO/chairman is presented in 
Appendix 4.  
 
It should be noted that the CEO or chairman of course can be related to the controlling family 
without sharing the same name, e.g. through marriage without a shared family name. 
However, this has not been taken under consideration in this specific study due the 
complexity of further family investigations.  
 
4.2.5 Quantifying Tone  
In order to find a correlation between tone in the narrative disclosure and the degree of family 
ownership, the tone must be quantified. To establish the general tone of the narrative 
disclosure studied, we extracted positive and negative words from the CEO-letters.  
What constitutes positive and negative words was decided from the words occurring in the 
wordlist of Elaine Henry (2008). This wordlist was developed specifically for texts in a 
financial context, making it suitable for this field of study. By using a pre-set wordlist 
developed specifically for this context, reliability was enhanced.  
 
Since the narratives studied are written in Swedish, the wordlist was translated into Swedish. 
The translation may pose a potential weakness, which we are aware of.  
Some English words have several possible Swedish translations. By taking this into account, 
and making sure that the Swedish words have the equivalent meaning in Swedish as the 
English word has in English, we argue that although the issue has not been fully mitigated, the 
limitation has been minimized to a certain extent.2  
Furthermore, we have implemented some alterations to the wordlist:  
 
- Some Swedish words frequently occurring in the Swedish CEO-letters simply lack an 
English equivalent in the wordlist of Henry (2008). Since we assess these words to be 
essential for capturing the tone more accurately, some words were added (words added are 
marked green in the wordlists). This was essential to capture a tone more representative of the 
underlying text, and thereby adding them improved validity. 
                                                              
2 For example, the English word ”unsettled” has some Swedish translations that does not reflect the meaning 
of the English word, such as “hemlös”, “öde” and “obebyggd” whereas more correct translations in this context 
would be “ouppklarad”, “olöst” or “tveksam”. 
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- In order for words that could occur as a part of other words (e.g. success is a part of 
successful) not to be counted several times, we shortened the words to the least common 
denominator where suitable. Furthermore, by doing so several forms of words were captured 
through the use of one, making the wordlist easier to use. 
  
- Words that have been classified as positive or negative by Henry (2008) but were more 
frequently used in a neutral context than not in the texts studied, were eliminated.  
This includes the Swedish words for “over” and “under” (i.e. “över” and “under”).  
 
The translated wordlists used in the word counts are presented below. See Appendix 1 & 2 for 
the full original English wordlist and the translation. 
 
 
 
It should be noted that the general tone in the narratives may be perceived differently by 
readers not involved in a financial context, making it more appropriate to use a wordlist based 
on a regular dictionary when studying impressions on non-financial readers (Rogers et. al, 
2011). However, throughout this thesis it has been assumed that the reader addressed is within 
a financial context, with at least some financial experience, which makes the wordlist of 
Henry (2008) suitable. Within a financial context, there are several wordlists available besides 
the one of Henry, the most prominent of which being the wordlist of Loughran & McDonald 
(2011). This wordlist is more extensive and may be more suitable for a larger scope.  
 
 
 
Negativity wordlist in Swedish 
avmatta avmattning avslå avslagit avslog avta avtog bestraffa bestraffning besviken besvikelse 
besvära besvärlig böter dala dämpa fara farlig faror fall falla fallande faller fallera fallit föll förlora 
förlust förvärra försvaga försämra försämring förvärring hopplös hot hotar hotfull hinder hindra 
instabil kostnadsökning kris krympa krymper krympt låg lågt låga lågkonjunktur lägre lägst matta 
motig motvind mindre minska minst minus minskning misslycka missnöjd missnöje missgynna 
missgynnsam missräkning nedanför nedgång nedgående nedslående nedsjunka nedåt negativ ner nere 
obestämd obestämt ofördelaktig olöst ostadig osäker ouppklarad oviss problem 
risk risker riskabel riskfylld riskfull sjunka sjunker sjönk sjunkit straff svacka svackor svag svika sviker 
svår tappa tillbakagång tuff tveka tveksam understiga understiger underträffa utmana utmaning vansklig 
vite värre värst åtstramning ödesdiger ödesdigra 
Positivity wordlist in Swedish 
attraktiv avgjord banbrytande briljera briljans briljant bedrift belöna belöning besegra bestämd bestämt 
bra bärig bättra bättre bäst definitiv engagera engagemang entusiasm entusiastisk effekt excellent 
expandera expansion fantastisk flexibel flexibla framgång framkant framsteg framskrider främja 
fungera förbättra förbättring fördel förträfflig förstärka förstärkt förstärks förstärkning gedigen god 
gynna gynnsam hopp hoppfull hållbar hög högre högst imponera innovation innovativ inspirera kraft 
konkurrenskraft kostnadsminskning kvalitet kvalitativ leda leder leverera lovande lycka lönsam mer 
mest möjlighet njut njöt nytta nöjd optimism optimistisk positiv potential potentiell prestation prestera 
record seger segra solid stabil stadig stark stiga stiger steg stigit styrka styrkor stärka stärker stor större 
störst succé sund säker tillfredsställd tillförsikt tillväxt upp uppåt uppmuntra uppnå utmärkt 
utomordentlig utveckla utveckling vinna vinner vital välmående välrenommérad välrenommérat värde 
växa växer växte vuxit åstadkom åtnjut åtnjöt öka överträffa överstiga överstiger översteg 
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4.2.5.1 Word Count  
In order to quantify tone, the occurrence and frequency of positive and negative words in the 
narratives studied must be observed, i.e. counted. In accordance with the method applied by 
Henry (2008), tone is calculated as “the count of positive words minus the count of negative 
words, divided by the sum of positive and negative word counts”. 
 
In this thesis, the word count was executed through the use of Microsoft Excel.   
Each of the positive and the negative words were set in the Excel sheet. When counting the 
words in excel, excel needs to be informed whether the word should be able to have a prefix 
or an ending. This was done through the use of “space” adjacent to the word in question, 
either before the word, after or both. However, when doing so, we found that excel did not 
count words followed by punctuation which is why words that are followed by punctuation 
have been specified.3 
 
Thereafter, each of the CEO-letters studied were copied into the sheet where the occurrence 
and frequency of the set words were counted in order to establish tone by the use of a formula 
expressing:  
Tone = (positive words – negative words) / (positive words + negative words)  
The count takes on a value ranging from -1 to +1. A completely positive tone would be +1 
and, in contrary, a completely negative tone would be -1 (Henry, 2008).  
 
It should be noted that term frequency count metrics (word counts) are not without flaw. 
While some words are unambiguously positive (e.g. excellent) or negative (e.g. disappointing) 
other words (e.g. increase and decrease) are potentially ambiguous and can have different 
meanings in different contexts. This is known as polysemy and is an important aspect of 
potential ambiguity to keep in mind when quantifying tone (Henry, 2008). In order for the 
count to reflect the actual tone used, the context must be taken into consideration. Each of the 
positive and negative words counted were looked up in the CEO-letters respectively in order 
to ensure that they were used in the way they were counted, i.e. positive or negative. If not, 
the word counts were manually adjusted. Accounting for the context in which the word is 
being used is essential to attain a more just quantification of tone, and hence, checking for 
context improves validity of the study. However, since the contexts were assessed manually, 
the method is, to a certain extent, subject to the researchers’ subjectivity. 
 
4.2.6 Statistical Approach 
Since this thesis seek to make conclusions about a population based on our sample,  
inferential statistics were used (Collis & Hussey, 2009). The statistical tests conducted are 
non-parametric since the dependent variable was not assumed to be normally distributed 
(UCLA Idre, 2015). The variables in this study are dichotomous and of interval level. Since 
the study seeks to investigate the potential associations of these variables, a bivariate analysis 
was conducted (Bryman & Bell, 2013). The tests used for the bivariate analysis were:  
 
- Mann-Whitney U Test: The Mann-Whitney U Test is a non-parametric test used to 
determine if the two groups are different or not. The test was used to establish whether there 
                                                              
3 For example, since the word ”bra” only should be counted as a standalone, and not within other words, space 
was used in front of and after the word in order to lock it. Because the word was locked for endings, it did not 
count the word if followed by punctuation. Accordingly, “bra” was also specified as “bra,” and “bra.” in the 
word count.  
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was a difference in tone between the two independent groups of firms; family and non-family 
firms. The test was applied to determine whether there was a difference in tone between firms 
where a family member of a controlling family holds the position of CEO and/or chairman of 
the board and firms where they do not.  
 
- Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation Test:  The test was used to establish the strength and 
direction (positive or negative) of association between the degree of family ownership and 
tone used in CEO-letter; that is, the correlation between tone and firms being family or non-
family firms.  
This test was also conducted to investigate if there was a correlation between the tone in the 
CEO-letter and a member of a controlling family holding the position as CEO or chairman of 
the board. Since there were only two groups, and the number of companies in each group 
differed quite a lot, the Spearman’s test of correlation is not optimal. However, this is the only 
test applicable for analysing the association of dichotomous and interval level variables.  
  
The correlations take on a value between -1, representing a perfect negative correlation, and 
+1, representing a perfect positive correlation between the variables. It should be noted that 
even if a correlation is established, this does not mean that causality exist. The correlation 
may be explained by several other variables (Collis & Hussey, 2009).   
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5. Empirical Study and Results  
This section will account for the statistical tests executed and the results derived from them. 
General descriptive statistics will be accounted for, and the results of the tests conducted to 
determine differences and investigate correlations will be presented.  
The findings in this section will be used in the subsequent analysis. 
The purpose of this study is to test whether there is a correlation between the degree of family 
ownership in terms of voting rights and the tone used in the disclosure narratives. 
Furthermore, the study seeks to test if having a family member as CEO and/or chairman of the 
board affects the tone used. By testing for these correlations, this thesis seeks to investigate if 
family ownership has an impact on the tone used in disclosure narratives and thereby tell if 
family firms are more or less inclined to use tone management. To achieve this purpose, the 
following hypotheses have been developed:  
 
?? There is a correlation between the tone used in CEO-letters and the degree of family 
ownership in the firm (family firms versus non-family firms). 
 
?? If a firm is considered a family firm, and has a family member as CEO and/or chairman of 
the board, they will present a more positive tone in the CEO-letter than non-family firms and 
family firms without family CEO and/or chairman of the board do.   
 
5.1 General Descriptive Statistics  
Out of the sample of 100 companies, 49 firms were classified as family firms, and 51 as non-
family firms. Further, out of the 49 family firms, 24 were considered to have a member of the 
controlling family as CEO and/or chairman of the board. A full table of the firms, the 
segmentations, largest shareholder in terms of voting rights and tone scores are available in 
Appendix 4.  
 
5.2 Tests of Hypothesis 1 
The first set of tests was conducted to test hypothesis 1 (H1). 
 
5.2.1 Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 1  
This table shows the descriptive values for tone within the two groups; family and non-family 
firms.  
  Number  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum 
Family firms  49  0,802  0,810  0,409  1,000 
Non‐family firms  51  0,807  0,840  0,359  1,000 
Sample total  100  0.805  0,824  0,359  1,000 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics  
 
The test showed a median tone-score of 0,810 for family firms, and 0,840 for non-family 
firms while the median for the entire sample was 0,824. Both groups had companies with the 
highest possible tone score of 1,000 indicating a perfectly positive tone. The lowest score in 
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the sample was found in the non-family firms group with a score of 0,359, whereas the 
minimum in the family firms group was a score of 0,409. The mean and median values for the 
non-family-firms group are slightly higher compared to those of the family firms, indicating 
that this group has a marginally more positive tone. 
 
5.2.2 Test of Differences for Hypothesis 1 
The two groups, family and non-family firms, were compared using the Mann–Whitney two-
sample rank sum test. The sample size of the test was 100 companies, whereof 49 companies 
were assigned to the group of family firms, and 51 companies were assigned to the group of 
the non-family firms.  
  Number  Mean rank  Sum of ranks 
Family firms  49  49,26  2415,00 
Non‐family firms  51  51,67  2635,00 
Mann-Whitney U  1190,000 
Wilcoxon W 2415,000 
Z -0,410 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,682 
Table 2 – The Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
The U-value of the test was 1190 with a z-score of -0,410 and a significance level of 0,682. 
The results tell us that that the null hypothesis of the test, that is, that the sample from the two 
groups came from the same population, cannot be rejected, and that the two groups are not 
statistically different.  
 
5.2.3 Test of Correlation for Hypothesis 1 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation  
Correlation Coefficient   0,041 
Sig. (2‐tailed)  0,684 
Table 3 – Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
 
A Spearman’s rank correlation test was run to see if there was any correlation between the 
two variables. The test gave a correlation coefficient of 0,041, showing a very weak 
correlation of the disclosure tone growing as the firm-variable changes from family-firms to 
non-family firms. This is supported by the mean value and median for tone being slightly 
higher in the group of non-family firms compared to the group of family-firms. However, the 
low correlation coefficient of 0,041 obtained from the Spearman’s test, where a coefficient of 
0 is the weakest possible, indicates that there is an unmentionable correlation between the 
tone and the family- and non-family –firm variable.  Further, the test p-value of 0,684 
indicates that the small correlation found is not statistically significant. 
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5.3 Tests of Hypothesis 2 
The second set of tests was conducted to test hypothesis 2 (H2).  
 
5.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis 2 
This table shows the descriptive values for tone within the two groups; firms with a family 
CEO/chairman and firms without a family CEO/chairman. 
  Number  Mean  Median  Minimum  Maximum
Family CEO/Chairman  24  0,767  0,761  0,409  0,957 
Non‐family CEO/Chairman  76  0,817  0,841  0,359  1,000 
Sample total  100  0,805  0,824  0,359  1,000 
Table 4 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
The test showed a median tone-score of 0,761 for family firms where a family member holds 
the position of CEO and/or chairman of the board. The median tone-score for firms that do 
not have a controlling family or do not have a family member in key positions was 0,841. 
The median for the entire sample was 0,824. In this test, none of the firms with a family 
member as CEO and/or chairman of the board had a completely positive tone, the highest tone 
found in this group was 0,957. Two firms in the group of non-family CEO/chairman had a 
completely positive tone. The mean and median values for the group of non-family 
CEO/chairman are slightly higher compared to those of the group with a family 
CEO/chairman, indicating that this group presents a slightly more positive tone. It should be 
noted that the mean and median of family firms sunk when the element of family 
CEO/chairman was present.  
 
5.3.2 Test of Differences for Hypothesis 2 
The two groups were compared using the Mann–Whitney two-sample rank sum test.  
Out of the 100 firms, 24 firms were family firms with a family member as CEO and/or 
chairman, and 76 firms were either non-family firms or family firms without a family member 
as CEO and/or chairman. 
  Number  Mean rank  Sum of ranks 
Family CEO/Chairman  24  42,50  1020,00 
Non‐family CEO/Chairman  76  53,03  4030,00 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 – The Mann-Whitney U Test 
 
The U-value of this test was 720 with a z-score of -1,550 and a significance level of 0,121.  
Also in this test, the two groups cannot be established to come from different populations and 
hence, the groups are not statistically different.  
Mann-Whitney U  720,000 
Wilcoxon W 1020,000 
Z -1,550 
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) 0,121 
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5.3.3 Test of Correlation for Hypothesis 2 
Spearman’s Rank Correlation  
Correlation Coeffifient   0,156 
Sig. (2‐tailed)  0,122 
Table 6 – Spearman’s Rank Correlation 
 
A Spearman’s rank correlation test was run to see if tone was affected by the firm having a 
family member as CEO and/or chairman of the board. The test gave a correlation coefficient 
of 0,156, indicating a weak correlation of the disclosure tone increasing as the variable of 
family CEO/chairman changes from present to absent. This is in accordance with the mean 
value and median for tone being higher for firms that do not have a family member as CEO 
and/or chairman of the board. Although the correlation between the variables in this test is 
weak, it is stronger than the correlation found in the previous test of correlation. However, the 
p-value of 0,122 indicates that the test results are not statistically significant.  
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6. Analysis and Discussion 
This section will provide a discussion on the findings from the empirical study with regards to 
the research purpose. The results from the statistical tests will be put together with the 
existing information accounted for in the literature review in order to validate or reject the 
hypotheses set up for this study. 
6.1 The Definition of Family Firms  
In order to see whether the tone used in the CEO-letter differed between firms that were 
considered family firms and those that were not, the firms studied had to be segmented. 
To divide the firms into family and non-family firms, a dichotomous segmentation with a 
threshold of 20% voting rights was used, which compared to several previous studies is a 
relatively high threshold. The segmentation of the sample generated 49 family firms and 51 
non-family firms. This distribution confirms that Sweden actually does have a considerable 
concentration of family ownership in firms, which emphasises the importance of taking 
aspects of family influence into consideration in accounting research. In this thesis, it has 
been assumed that if a family possesses 20% of the voting rights, they will also exercise these 
rights and thereby obtain the control of the company as argued by Faccio and Lang (2002). 
On that note, the family’s ownership in terms of voting rights has been considered a 
representative proxy for the family’s actual involvement and influence, defined as the 
involvement approach to identify family firms (Miller et. al, 2013).  
  
However, this proxy does not necessarily constitute a true reflection of the actual conditions 
in all cases. Deephouse and Jaskiewicz (2013) suggest that the mere presence of family 
involvement (in this case holding 20% of voting rights) might not be sufficient to identify 
family firms. In other words; just because a family has the possibility to practise a certain 
amount of voting rights, does not necessarily mean that it will. The essence approach 
suggests that firms should be segmented based on the impact of the family involvement, 
rather than the mere presence of it (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013).  The essence approach 
may provide a segmentation of firms more representative to reality. Nonetheless, the actual 
impact of the family might be more difficult to quantify and measure, whereas a set threshold 
is relatively easy to objectively identify. The number of firms identified as family firms, as 
well as the results, may have turned out different, had a different threshold or the essence 
approach been used.  
 
6.2 Correlation between Tone and Degree of Family Ownership 
The first set of tests was conducted to test if there is a correlation between the tone used in 
CEO-letters and the degree of family ownership in the firm (H1). In the tests of hypothesis 1, 
the mean value and the median for tone in family firms were lower than in non-family firms. 
This indicates that family firms present a slightly less positive tone than non-family firms, 
which may be interpreted as family firms engaging in less tone management than non-family 
firms do.  
However, both groups presented over all high values, and cases of completely positive tone 
(score 1,00) were found in both groups. None of the groups presented any cases of neutral or 
negative tone. This fact could further strengthen the suggestion that narrative disclosures, 
being easy targets for tone management and interpretation, should be considered fully 
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promotional and maybe not be considered as a material statement of fact at all (Rogers et. al, 
2011). On the other hand, even if the CEO-letter has promotional traits and the general tone 
perceived from it may be managed to a certain extent, one might argue that there is still an 
underlying reality which can be modified, but not completely ignored by the author in the 
CEO-letter.  
 
The test of differences showed a slightly more positive tone occurring in the non-family firms, 
which is in line with the group of non-family firms presenting a higher mean value and 
median. Furthermore, a correlation of disclosure tone, although weak, was found as the firm-
variable changed from family-firms to non-family firms. All empirical results unanimously 
indicate that non-family firms use a more positive tone in their CEO-letters, and might 
therefore be assumed to engage in tone management to a higher extent than family firms.  
 
In non-family firms there is a separation of ownership and management to a greater extent 
than in family firms. This may give rise to information asymmetries and goal incongruence 
between shareholders and CEO; which is a prominent feature within agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). If the results of this study are explored with an agency point of view, a 
possible explanation as to why non-family firms would engage more in tone management may 
therefore be the CEO’s tendency to act more opportunistic and self-serving in his/her role as 
an agent, making it an agency problem of type I (Prencipe et. al, 2014). The CEO is the author 
of the CEO-letter, providing him with control over a part that is suitable for tone management 
(i.e. a “vehicle”). Since there are no explicit rules for what to disclose and how to word it, the 
construction of it is easier to shape to the authors’ liking than e.g. presentation of figures 
(Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013). Therefore, the CEO-letter can be assumed to be shaped to 
the CEO’s subjective liking. This is more likely to be a problem in non-family firms due to 
the goal incongruence and the fact that it is more difficult for the shareholders in non-family 
firms to monitor the CEO (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985)  
 
The more positive tone occurring in the CEO-letter of non-family firms might be evidence of 
an economical and psychological perspective of impression management being adopted, 
manifesting itself through reporting and self-serving bias (Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013).  
Reporting bias would be the CEO manipulating the readers’ perceptions through valence and 
tone; emphasising positive and obfuscating negative performances. This is related to the 
opportunistic behaviour of agency theory, leading to a more positive tone score (Brennan & 
Merkl-Davies, 2013). Self-serving bias might also contribute to the more positive tone of non-
family firms, using a positive tone when seeking to claim responsibility for good 
performances (Aerts & Cheng, 2011). Their use of a more positive tone might indicate that 
they carry out these biases through thematic manipulation; using tone to emphasise good 
news and performances in the CEO-letter (Merkl-Davies & Brennan, 2007). 
 
On the contrary, the less positive tone presented in the CEO-letters of family firms may be 
explained by family firms having an increased ability to monitor and control the CEO, and 
thereby evading agency problems of type I (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).   
The absence of type I agency problems in family firms might be further explained by family 
firms being more prone to stewardship-like behaviours. If so, the opportunistic behaviours of 
the agent are eliminated and the incentive to engage in tone management because of that 
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behaviour is minimized. A possible explanation as to why family firms could be more prone 
to adopt stewardship behaviours is that families naturally share a social context. The very 
nature of family can be argued to be characterised by the members’ interdependence and 
interaction, and it is under circumstances like these that stewardship relationships are known 
to arise (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998). The presence of non-economic factors 
such as emotional attachment, loyalty and concerns of the firm’s longevity in family firms 
might also be contributing to stewardship behaviours evolving in family firms (Gomez-Mejia 
et. al, 2011).  
 
Presenting a less positive tone in the CEO-letter may indicate that family firms are permeated 
by a collectivistic organizational culture. If the results of the study is explored with a 
stewardship theory point of view, both the family and the CEO can be assumed to act without 
self-serving interests. If the family as well as the CEO can be viewed as collectively oriented 
beings, first and foremost concerned with acting in the best interest of the group and 
organization, it may lead them to disclose more honestly and not use tone management to 
create an excessively positive tone (Davis et. al, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). 
This could possibly contribute to family firms’ tone scores being lower than those of non-
family firms.  
  
However, although the tests of differences and correlation of the first hypothesis showed that 
family firms present a less positive tone in their CEO-letters, indicating that there are 
differences in tone depending on the degree of family ownership, none of the results were 
statistically significant. The p-values of the Mann-Whitney U Test and the Spearman’s Rank 
Correlation was 0,682 and 0,684, indicating that there is no statistical significance to the 
results. Accordingly, since no statistically significant correlation between tone and degree of 
family ownership could be established, hypothesis 1 must be rejected.  
 
6.3 Correlation between tone and Family Members in Key Positions  
The second set of tests was conducted in order to test if family firms with a family member as 
CEO and/or chairman of the board would present a more positive tone in the CEO-letter 
(H2). This hypothesis was developed in order investigate whether possible entrenchment 
effects would reflect themselves in the CEO-letter trough the tone used. In order to test this, 
the segmentation of the firms had to be altered. In the second set of tests, the groups studied 
were (1) family firms where a family member holds the position of CEO and/or chairman of 
the board, and (2) non-family firms or family firms where a family member does not hold such 
a position.   
 
In the tests of hypothesis 2, the mean value and median of family firms declined further when 
a family member served as CEO and/or chairman of the board. Before the firms were further 
segmented, family firms presented a mean value of 0,802 and a median of 0,810. When the 
aspect of family members in key positions were added, the mean value sunk to 0,767 and the 
median to 0,761. Furthermore, after adding this aspect to the segmentation, this group no 
longer presented any firm with a completely positive tone. These results indicate that when 
family firms have a family member as CEO and/or chairman, it causes the tone in the CEO-
letter to be even less positive. Accordingly, family firms with a family member as CEO and/or 
chairman of the board could be assumed to engage in less tone management than non-family 
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firms or family firms without a family CEO/chairman do.  
Although the mean and median tone score have sunk for one group in this test, the overall 
tone is still very positive and unchanged from the previous tests, since the same sample is 
used.  
 
The test of differences showed a less positive tone occurring in the group of family firms 
where a family member holds the position of CEO and/or chairman of the board.  
When testing for association of the variables, a correlation coefficient of 0,156 was found.  
This indicates a relatively weak correlation, where the disclosure tone decreases as the 
variable of family CEO/chairman goes from absent to present. These results are supported by 
the lower mean value and median of this group. Although the correlation of 0,156 is relatively 
weak, the correlation is stronger than in the previous tests (0,041) when the aspect of family 
CEO/chairman had not yet been added. The empirical results indicate that having a family 
member as CEO or chairman of the board might further reduce the positivity of tone in the 
CEO-letter. Furthermore, it suggests that having a family member in a key position causes 
family firms to engage even less in tone management. 
 
As found in the previous section (6.2), a possible explanation for the higher tone found in 
non-family firms might be the presence of opportunistic agency behaviour, causing agency 
problem type I to arise (Prencipe et. al, 2014). This explanation could also be applied to firms 
considered to be family firms, but where a family member does not serve as CEO and/or 
chairman of the board. The empirical results suggest that family firms where a member of the 
controlling family serves as CEO and/or chairman of the board presents a less positive tone 
than family firms without family CEO/chairman and non-family firms.  
The further reduction of positive tone found when the family member aspect is added, 
suggests that when a family member holds a key position, agency problems of type I are 
further reduced or even eliminated. 
 
The reduction or elimination of opportunistic behaviour (agency problems of type I) could 
indicate that family firms where a family member serves as CEO and/or chairman are 
characterized by a more collective rather than a individualistic corporate culture, implying 
stewardship relationships within these firms. The more dampened tone used by family firms 
where a family member serves as CEO/chairman could be an expression for the family’s, and 
thereby the CEO’s, strive to disclose more honestly (Davis et. al, 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 
1991). The incentive to do so may stem from dimensions of stewardship theory referred to as 
Continuity, community and connection; which concerns the family’s non-economic strive for 
long-term relationships (internally and externally) and passing the firm on to future 
generations  (Miller et. al, 2008). The family’s strive for the firm’s longevity may serve as 
incentive to reduce the amount of risk to which the firm is exposed to. Since an excessively 
positive tone has been proven to associate with risk, both in terms of litigation and credibility, 
the family might seek to dampen the tone in order to avoid litigation and damage to the firm’s 
image and reputation Rogers et. al, 2011; Rahman, 2012).  
 
However, if this strive and long-term objectives of the family are incongruent with the 
objectives of minority shareholders, dampening the tone might also be seen as an 
entrenchment effect (agency problem type II) carried out by the family from the minority 
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shareholders’ point of view. The minority shareholders might not have the same long-term 
objectives as the family and/or be more prone to risk than the family, and hence, not consider 
the family’s dampening of the tone to work in their favour. Since the family has entrenched 
itself further with a family member as CEO/chairman, the minority shareholder has a 
restricted ability to change and affect the tone used. If there is an incongruence between the 
tone used by majority shareholders (family) and the tone desired by the minority shareholders, 
the family is taking actions to serve their own utility at the expense of minority shareholders’. 
On that note, the dampened tone could be considered an entrenchment effect and hence, 
indicate that agency problems of type II are present (Gilson & Gordon, 2003; Morck et. al, 
2005; Ali et. al, 2002). Even though it might be difficult to gather evidence of entrenchment 
through analysing the tone, agency problems of type II could still be present and manifest 
itself in other forums. That is, entrenchment effects could, but does not necessarily have to, 
reflect in the tone used.  
 
The tests of differences and correlation provided indications that family firms where a family 
member serves as CEO and/or chairman of the board presented a less positive tone than non-
family firms or family firms without a family CEO/chairman, indicating that having a family 
member in a key position might further reduce tone management. This association is 
contradictory to the expected association expressed in the second hypothesis, where we 
expected family firms with a family member as CEO and/or chairman of the board to present 
a more positive tone.  
Moreover, with a p-value of 0,121 in the Mann Whitney U Test and 0,122 in the Spearman’s 
Rank Correlation, the results are not statistically significant. Accordingly, the second 
hypothesis must be rejected in two aspects. First, the association found was reverse to the 
expected one and second, the results of the tests were not statistically significant.  
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7. Concluding Remarks  
This section will present the conclusions drawn from the empirical results and the analysis. 
Through the conclusions, the hypotheses will be validated or rejected and the research 
questions and purpose will be answered. Additionally, suggestions for further research will be 
presented. The suggestions are based on potential limitations of this study and potentially 
interesting areas within the field.   
7.1 Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this study is to test whether there is a correlation between the degree of family 
ownership in terms of voting rights and the tone used in the disclosure narratives. 
Furthermore, the study seeks to test if having a family member as CEO and/or chairman of 
the board affects the tone used. By testing for these correlations, this thesis seeks to 
investigate if family ownership have an impact on the tone used in disclosure narratives and 
thereby tell if family firms are more or less inclined to use tone management. 
 
In order to achieve the purpose, following hypotheses were developed:  
?? There is a correlation between the tone used in CEO-letters and the degree of family 
ownership in the firm (family firms versus non-family firms). 
 
?? If a firm is considered a family firm, and has a family member as CEO and/or chairman of 
the board, they will present a more positive tone in the CEO-letter than non-family firms and 
family firms without family CEO and/or chairman of the board do.   
 
In this study, no statistically significant evidence that there would be a correlation between the 
degree of family ownership and tone used in disclosure narratives with the CEO-letter serving 
as proxy was found. This led to the rejection of hypothesis 1.  
However, all of the empirical results gathered unanimously suggest that family firms present a 
tendency to use a slightly less positive tone in the CEO-letter than non-family firms do.  
A possible explanation for this tendency is that family firms face less severe agency problems 
of type I than non-family firms, due to the family having a greater possibility to monitor the 
CEO and/or the chairman of the board. Thereby, the family is able to ensure that these 
“agents” no longer act like opportunistic agents, but in accordance with the family’s wishes 
and hence, eliminating goal incongruence between the principal and the agent.  
 
An alternative explanation for the lower tone score of family firms is the occurrence of 
stewardship behaviours within family firms. Non-economic factors and intrinsic motivations, 
such as loyalty, longevity of the firm and self-actualization, causes the CEO to act in a less 
self-serving and opportunistic manner and thereby be more honest in disclosure.  
 
When testing for families’ potential further impact on tone through having family members in 
key positions, no statistically significant evidence of correlation was found.  
Nonetheless, the results implies that increased family involvement, through family members 
serving as CEO and/or chairman of the board, may further reduce the positivity in the tone 
used. This phenomenon might be explained by the more risk averse nature of families, given 
their strive to secure the firm’s longevity and long-term oriented objectives and thereby being 
 32 
 
able to pass the firm on to future generations. Along with this, family firms are concerned 
with maintaining an undamaged reputation and keeping up long-term relationships.  
These non-economic factors indicate stewardship behaviours in family firms.  
 
The family entrenches itself by appointing family members to key positions, such as CEO or 
chairman. Whether this entrenchment reflects itself in the tone used in narratives is hard to 
establish. Although the empirical results indicated a decrease in tone when a family member 
holds a key position, this study has not been able to establish whether this is related to 
entrenchment effects.  
The results found suggested an association opposite to the expected one expressed in the 
second hypothesis, where family firms with a family member as CEO and/or chairman of the 
board were expected to present a more positive tone. This, in combination with the absence of 
statistically significance, led to the rejection of hypothesis 2.  
 
The thesis aimed to answer the following research questions: 
* Is there a difference in tone (words chosen and their frequency) used in the CEO-letters 
of annual reports by family firms versus non-family firms?  
No statistically significant evidence for correlation between tone and the degree of family 
ownership was found. However, the results indicated a tendency for family firms to present a 
less positive tone.  
 
* If a family member holds the position of CEO and/or chairman of the board; does this 
influence the tone used?  
No statistically significant evidence for correlation between tone and whether firms have a 
family member as CEO and/or chairman of the board was found. However, the results 
indicated a tendency for firms where a family member serves as CEO/chairman to use a less 
positive tone. The less positive tone already found in family firms, was further reduced when 
a family member served as CEO and/or chairman of the board.  
  
* Can agency or stewardship theory provide possible explanations for these possible 
differences?  
As elaborated in the analysis and the conclusion above, aspects from both agency and 
stewardship theory can be used to explain the differences found between family and non-
family firms in this study. This has led us to conclude that, in accordance with Prencipe et. al 
(2014), both theories can and should be used as a complement to one another to better 
understand family firms. 
 
To conclude, the overall tone found in the CEO-letters was very positive, indicating an overall 
promotional nature of this narrative vehicle. The empirical results of this study were not 
statistically significant, which caused us to reject both of the hypotheses in this thesis. 
However, despite the rejection of the hypotheses, there might still be correlations and 
causalities between the tone used in narrative disclosures and the degree of family ownership, 
as well as having a family member in a key position. The results might have been different 
with a larger sample. Thus, further research is needed in order to make any general 
conclusions about the impact of family ownership on disclosure tone and whether family 
firms are more or less inclined to use tone management.  
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7.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
Throughout the process of conducting this study and writing up the thesis, ideas for possible 
further research has emerged. There are aspects to this field of study that this particular thesis 
does not cover, but could be of interest and further contribute to the field.  
On that note, we would like to express some of our suggestions for further research: 
 
First of all, it would be interesting to conduct a study similar to this one, but test the 
hypotheses with a few alterations. The tone used in disclosure narratives might be affected by 
several other factors important to establish causality in the study; correlation does not 
automatically establish causality between the variables. 
As previously described, the mere presence of positive or negative tone should not be 
assumed to be evidence of impression management; a certain amount of positive tone is only 
natural if the firm is performing well, and vice versa (Henry, 2008; Rogers et. al, 2011). 
Therefore, the associations of this study could be tested with firm performance taken into 
account through including e.g. earnings ratios, which was a limitation in this thesis. 
Moreover, since the overall tone found in the CEO-letters was very positive, indicating an 
overall promotional nature of this narrative vehicle, it might be suitable to conduct further 
research on other narratives.  
Furthermore, as mentioned in our analysis, the results may have turned out different, should 
another method to define family firms be applied. If, as in this study, a dichotomous 
segmentation with an involvement approach is used to identify family firms, it would be 
interesting to see the effects of lowering the threshold to 10% of voting rights. A threshold of 
10% has been used to define family firms in other studies previous to ours. This would 
possibly increase the number of firms considered to be family firms, and potentially make an 
impact on the results of differences and association.  
Another possible alteration to the identification of family firms would be to use an essence 
approach instead of involvement approach, and thereby consider the actual effects caused by 
family ownership, rather than using the mere degree of family ownership as a proxy to reflect 
the family’s involvement. Moreover, instead of a dichotomous segmentation, which has been 
argued to be a much too big generalization of firms, the study could be conducted with a 
continuous scale, such as the F-PEC scale mentioned in the literature review, to evaluate the 
family’s influence and define family firms.  
All of the alterations mentioned above could have a potential impact on the results derived 
from the tests and lead to a different conclusion regarding the hypotheses.  
 
Second, as described in section 2.1, thematic manipulation (tone management) is only one out 
of seven possible ways to carry out impression management in the narrative parts of annual 
reports. We find that it could be interesting to investigate the use of reading ease 
manipulation in disclosure narratives; that is, whether firms seek to influence the recipient’s 
impression of the narrative information by making it more or less difficult to read.  
The underlying general assumptions of readability are that the longer the texts are, the more 
words per sentence and the more complex words per sentence used, the lower the readability. 
Since low readability provides lower quality of disclosure to the reader, it would be 
interesting to see whether firms use readability to obfuscate bad news or performances.  
This could be explored through the use of computational linguistics such as the FOG-index in 
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correlation to e.g. different earnings ratios. Furthermore, it could be of interest to compare the 
use of reading ease manipulation in narratives between family firms and non-family firms.  
 
Finally, another potential area for further research could be to investigate if there are any 
differences in tone between countries or industries. This comparison could also be applied to 
the aspect of readability. Are some countries or industries more inclined to engage in 
impression management than others and if so, what possible explanations are there?  
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9. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Original Wordlists by Henry (2008)   
 
 
 
    
NEGATIVITY  wordlist: 
 negative negatives fail fails failing failure weak weakness weaknesses difficult difficulty hurdle hurdles 
obstacle obstacles slump slumps slumping slumped uncertain uncertainty unsettled unfavourable downturn 
depressed disappoint disappoints disappointing disappointed disappointment risk risks risky threat threats 
penalty penalties down decrease decreases decreasing decreased decline declines declining declined fall 
falls falling fell fallen drop drops dropping dropped deteriorate deteriorates deteriorating deteriorated 
worsen worsens worsening weaken weakens weakening weakened worse worst low lower lowest less least 
smaller smallest shrink shrinks shrinking shrunk below under challenge challenges challenging challenged 
POSITIVITY wordlist:  
positive positives success successes successful succeed succeeds succeeding succeeded accomplish 
accomplishes accomplishing accomplished accomplishment accomplishments strong strength 
strengths certain certainty definite solid excellent good leading achieve achieves achieved achieving 
achievement achievements progress progressing deliver delivers delivered delivering leader leading 
pleased reward rewards rewarding rewarded opportunity opportunities enjoy enjoys enjoying enjoyed 
encouraged encouraging up increase increases increasing increased rise rises rising rose risen improve 
improves improving improved improvement improvements strengthen strengthens strengthening 
strengthened stronger strongest better best more most above record high higher highest greater 
greatest larger largest grow grows growing grew grown growth expand expands expanding expanded 
expansion exceed exceeds exceeded exceeding beat beats beating 
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Appendix 2: Translation of Wordlists  
The following wordlists are the Swedish translations of the English wordlists by Henry 
(2008). The Swedish words in bold (to some extent the least common denominator of the 
words) are the ones used in the word counts in this study.  
 
Negativity:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
English Swedish
Negative, negatives negativ ‐t, ‐a, ‐itet, ‐iteter
Fail, fails, failing, failiure misslycka ‐s, ‐t,  ‐d, ‐ande, ‐anden; fallera ‐r, ‐t
Weak, weakness, weaknesses svag  ‐het, ‐heter, ‐t, ‐a
Difficult, difficulty svår ‐t, ‐a, ‐ighet, igheter; besvärlig ‐t, ‐a, ‐het, ‐heter; tuff ‐t, ‐a; problem ‐en ‐atisk
Hurdle, hurdles, obsacle, obstacles hinder
Slumps, slumps, slumping, slumped svacka ‐r, ‐n; svackor ‐na; nedsjunka; tillbakagång ‐ar, ‐en, kris ‐er, ‐en 
Uncertain, uncertainty osäker ‐t, ‐het; oviss ‐t, ‐a, ‐het; ostadig ‐t, ‐a; tveksam ‐t, ‐ma; tveka ‐n; obestämd ‐a; obestämt
Unsettled olöst ‐a; ouppklarad ‐e;  tveksam ‐t, ‐ma
Unfavorable missgynnsam ‐t, ‐ma; ofördelaktig ‐t, ‐a
Downturn nedgång ‐ar, ‐en, ‐arna; försämring ‐ar,‐en, ‐arna; förvärring ‐ar, ‐en, ‐arna
Depressed minska ‐t,  ‐d, ‐nde, ‐de
Disappoint, disappoints, disappointing, disappointed, disappointment svika; sviker; nedslående; besviken; besvikelse ‐n, ‐er, ‐erna; missräkning ‐en, ‐er
Risk, risks, risky  risk ‐era ‐en ; risker ‐na; riskabel ‐t, riskfylld ‐a; riskfull ‐a; vansklig ‐a, ‐t
Threat, threats hot ‐a, ‐as; hotar; fara ‐n; faror ‐na; farlig ‐t, ‐a
Penalty, penalties straff ‐en, et, ‐as, ‐at; vite ‐n; bestraffa ‐r, ‐s, ‐t; bestraffning ‐ar; böter
Down ner; nere; nedåt ‐gående
Decrease, decreases, decreasing, decreased minska ‐d, ‐nde, ‐de; minskning ‐en, ‐ar, ‐arna; avta ‐r, ‐gande; avtog
Decline, declines, declining, declined nedgång ‐ar, ‐en, ‐arna; nedgående; avta ‐r,  ‐gande; avtog; tillbakagång ‐ar, ‐en; avslå ‐s; avslog ‐s; avslagit‐s
Fall, falls, falling, fell, fallen fall; falla; faller; fallit; föll; fallande; dala ‐t, ‐t; sjunka; sjunker; sjönk; sjunkit
Drop, drops, dropping, dropped tappa ‐r, ‐t, ‐de; fall; faller; fallit; föll; fallande; dala ‐t, ‐t; sjunka; sjunker; sjönk; sjunkit
Deteriorate, deteriorates, deteriorating, deteriorated förvärra ‐r, ‐s, ‐de, ‐nde, ‐t, ‐ts; försämra ‐r, ‐s, ‐t, ‐ts, ‐nde
Worse, worst, worsen, worsens, worsening värre; värst ‐a; förvärra ‐r, ‐s, ‐de , ‐t, ‐ts, ‐ande; försämra  ‐r, ‐s, ‐de, ‐nde, ‐t, ‐ts
Weaken, weakens, weakening, weakened  försvaga ‐r, ‐t, ‐nde, ‐ning; avmatta ‐r, ‐s, ‐ts; avmattning ‐en, ‐ar; matta ‐r, ‐s, ‐ts
Low, lower, lowest låg; låga; lågt; lägre; lägst ‐a 
Less, least mindre; minus;minst ‐a
Smaller, smallest mindre; minst ‐a
Shrink, shrinks, shrinking, shrunk krympa ‐s, ‐nde; krymper; krympt ‐e
Below, under nedanför; understiga ‐nde; understiger
Challenge, challenges, challenging, challenged utmaning ‐ar, ‐arna; utmana ‐r, ‐t, ‐ande, ‐s, ‐ts
Other added Negative Swedish Words
Besvära ‐s, ‐t, ‐ts, ‐de, ‐des
Dämpa ‐s, ‐t, ‐ts, ‐de, ‐des
Förlust ‐er, ‐en, ‐erna, ‐bringande
Förlora ‐r, ‐s, ‐ts, ‐des
Hindra ‐r, ‐s, ‐t, ‐de, ‐des
Hotfull ‐t, ‐a
Hopplös ‐t, ‐a
Instabil ‐t, ‐a
Kostnadsökning ‐ar, ‐en‐ arna
Lågkonjunktur
Missgynna ‐r, ‐t, ‐de, ‐des
Missnöje ‐t
Missnöjd ‐a
Motig ‐t, ‐a
Motvind ‐ar, ‐arna, ‐en
Underträffa ‐r, ‐s, ‐t, ‐ts
Åtstramning ‐ar, ‐en, ‐arna
Öderdiger ‐t; ödesdigra
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Positivity:  
 
English Swedish
Positive, positives positiv ‐t, ‐a, ‐itet; attraktiv‐t, ‐a
Success, successes, successful framgång‐en, ‐ar, ‐srik; succé ‐er
Succeed, succeeds, succeeding, succeeded lycka‐s, ‐d, ‐des; succé ‐er
Accomplish, accomplishes, accomplishing, accomplishment(‐s) åstadkom ‐ma, ‐mer, ‐mande(n), ‐mit; prestation ‐er
Strong stark ‐a, ‐ast; bärig ‐a; kraft ‐full
Strength, strengths styrka; styrkor; kraft
Certain, certainty säker ‐het; stabil ‐t, ‐a
Definite  bestämd; bestämt; definitiv ‐t; avgjord
Solid solid‐a, itet; stadig‐a, ‐t, gedigen
Excellent excellent‐a; utmärkt ‐a; utomordentlig ‐t, ‐a; förträfflig ‐a, ‐t
Good bra; god ‐a 
Leading, leader  leda ‐nde, ‐re; leder
Achieve, achieves, achieved, achieving uppnå ‐r, ‐s , ‐tt, ‐de, ‐else; åstadkom ‐ma, ‐mer, ‐mit; prestera  ‐t, ‐r, ‐de
Achievement, achievements uppnå‐ else, elser; åstadkom ‐mande, ‐manden, bedrift ‐er, ‐en; prestation ‐er, ‐en
Progress, progressing  framsteg ‐en; utveckla ‐s, ‐t, ‐de; utveckling ‐en, ‐ar; framskrider
Deliver, delivers, delivered, delivering leverera ‐r, ‐s, ‐t
Pleased nöjd ‐a; tillfredsställd
Reward, rewards, rewarding, rewarded belöning ‐ar, ‐en; belöna ‐r, ‐s, ‐t, ‐ts, ‐nde; lönsam ‐t, ‐ma
Opportunity, opportunities möjlighet ‐er, ‐en, ‐erna
Enjoy, enjoys, enjoying, enjoyed åtnjut ‐a, er, ‐it; njut ‐a, ‐er, ‐it; njöt; åtnjöt
Encourage, encouraging uppmuntra ‐r, ‐s, ‐ande; främja ‐r, ‐s, ‐nde
Up upp; uppåt ‐gående
Increase, increases, increasing, increased öka ‐r, ‐s, ‐de, ‐nde
Rise, rises, rising, rose, risen stiga ‐nde; stiger; steg; stigit
Improve, improves, improving, improved, improvement(s) förbättra ‐r, ‐s, ‐de, ‐des; förbättring ‐en, ‐ar, ‐arna; bättra ‐r, ‐s, ‐de, ‐des
Strenghten, strengthens, strengthening, strenghthened förstärka ‐s; förstärks, förstärkt ‐a, ‐es; förstärkning ‐ar, ‐arna; stärka; stärker
Stronger, strongest stark‐are, ‐ast, ‐aste
Better bättre
Best bäst ‐a
More, most mer ‐a; mest ‐a
Above överstiga; överstiger
Record rekord
High, higher, highest hög; högre; högst ‐a
Greater, gratest, larger, largest större; störst ‐a
Grow, grows, growing, grew, grown, growth växa ‐nde;  växer; växte; vuxit; tillväxt ‐en
Expand, expands, expanding, expanded, expansion expandera ‐r, ‐s, ‐t, ‐ts, ‐nde; expansion ‐er, ‐en, ‐ena
Exceed, exceeds, exceeded, exceeding överträffa ‐r , ‐t, ‐nde, ‐de; överstiga ‐s, ‐nde; översteg; överstiger
Beat, beats, beating besegra ‐s, ‐r, ‐nde; vinna ‐s, ‐nde, ‐re; vinner; segra ‐r, ‐nde
Other added Positive Swedish words 
Banbrytande 
Briljera; briljant; briljans
Effekt ‐iv, ‐ivitet, ‐ivisera, ‐iviserat, ‐iviseras
Engagera ‐d, ‐de; engagemang
Entusiasm ‐en; entusiastisk ‐a
Fantastisk ‐t, ‐a
Flexibel ‐t; flexibla
Framkant ‐en
Fungera ‐r, ‐t , ‐nde
Fördel‐ar,‐aktig,‐ar,‐arna,‐en
Gynna ‐r, ‐s, ‐t, ‐ande; gynnsam ‐t, ‐a
Hopp ‐as; hoppfull ‐t, ‐a
Hållbar ‐t, ‐a, ‐het
Innovation ‐er,‐erna,  ‐en; innovativ ‐itet, ‐t
Imponera ‐r, ‐nde, ‐t, ‐s
Inspirera ‐r, ‐t, ‐ts, ‐nde 
Kostnadsminkning ‐en, ‐ar, ‐arna
Kvalitet ‐en; kvalitativ ‐a
Konkurrenskraft ‐ig, ‐iga, ‐en
Lovande
Nytta
Optimism‐ en; optimistisk ‐t, ‐a
Potential ‐en; potentiell ‐a, ‐t
Sund ‐a 
Seger
Tillförsikt
Vital ‐a, ‐t, ‐itet
Välmående
Välrenommérad; välrenommérat 
Värde ‐t, ‐n, ‐full, ‐fullt,‐fulla
Stor ‐t, ‐a
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Appendix 3: Word Count 
Firm Positive Negative Adjust. Pos. Adjust. Neg. Positive Tot. Negative Tot. Tone Family Firm
ABB 140 14 ‐1 ‐2 139 12 0,841 No
Addtech 93 5 ‐11 0 82 5 0,885 No
Alfa Laval 114 9 2 ‐2 116 7 0,886 No
Assa Abloy 217 30 5 ‐9 222 21 0,827 Yes
AstraZeneca  63 25 ‐10 0 53 25 0,359 No
Atlas Copco 110 10 3 ‐3 113 7 0,883 Yes
Atrium Ljungberg 54 7 ‐3 ‐1 51 6 0,789 No
Avanza Bank Holding 95 22 9 ‐16 104 6 0,891 No
Axfood  88 5 3 ‐1 91 4 0,916 Yes
Axis 72 5 ‐1 ‐4 71 1 0,972 No
Beijer Alma  41 10 ‐3 ‐1 38 9 0,617 Yes
Beijer ref 62 17 ‐1 0 61 17 0,564 No
Betsson  50 1 ‐1 0 49 1 0,960 No
BillerudKorsnäs 101 17 ‐7 ‐6 94 11 0,790 No
Biogaia  50 8 ‐7 ‐1 43 7 0,720 Yes
Boliden 88 21 ‐16 ‐3 72 18 0,600 No
Byggmax  52 12 ‐3 ‐7 49 5 0,815 No
Castellum 58 14 ‐1 ‐7 57 7 0,781 No
Clas Ohlson 80 5 ‐11 1 69 6 0,840 No
Cloetta 57 6 2 ‐6 59 0 1,000 Yes
Concentic  67 18 ‐2 ‐1 65 17 0,585 No
Diös fastigheter  43 1 ‐8 3 35 4 0,795 No
Duni 77 1 ‐15 1 62 2 0,938 Yes
Electrolux 95 18 1 ‐5 96 13 0,761 Yes
Elekta 82 3 ‐1 ‐2 81 1 0,976 Yes
Ericsson 93 10 ‐4 ‐1 89 9 0,816 Yes
Fabege 74 4 ‐4 ‐3 70 1 0,972 No
Fast Partner  92 34 ‐30 ‐8 62 26 0,409 Yes
Fast. Balder 30 1 ‐8 2 22 3 0,760 Yes
Fingerprint cards   30 1 ‐1 ‐1 29 0 1,000 No
Getinge 92 18 ‐13 1 79 19 0,612 Yes
Gränges  103 17 1 ‐7 104 10 0,825 No
Haldex 78 11 ‐14 0 64 11 0,707 No
Handelsbanken 107 17 ‐8 ‐11 99 6 0,886 No
Heba  66 9 ‐1 ‐7 65 2 0,940 No
Hemfosa Fastigheter 21 3 ‐1 ‐2 20 1 0,905 No
Hennes & Mauritz 79 3 ‐12 0 67 3 0,914 Yes
Hexagon 58 11 ‐5 1 53 12 0,631 Yes
Hexpol 112 8 ‐3 ‐3 109 5 0,912 Yes
HiQ International   44 2 ‐4 ‐1 40 1 0,951 No
Hoist Finance  51 2 ‐5 0 46 2 0,917 Yes
Holmen 82 15 ‐5 ‐4 77 11 0,750 Yes
Hufvudstaden 91 15 ‐6 ‐3 85 12 0,753 Yes
Husqvarna 98 14 ‐11 ‐3 87 11 0,776 Yes
ICA Gruppen 95 6 ‐9 ‐2 86 4 0,911 No
Industrial & Financial Sys. 39 4 ‐1 0 38 4 0,810 Yes
Industrivärlden 173 22 ‐41 ‐1 132 21 0,725 No
Indutrade 42 20 ‐8 ‐6 34 14 0,417 Yes
Intrum Justitia  75 4 ‐7 0 68 4 0,889 No
Investor 139 12 2 ‐8 141 4 0,945 Yes
JM 80 11 ‐6 ‐5 74 6 0,850 No
Kinnevik 73 5 ‐1 ‐1 72 4 0,895 Yes
Klövern  51 13 ‐5 ‐4 46 9 0,673 No
Kungsleden 78 3 ‐7 ‐1 71 2 0,945 No
Latour 91 13 ‐6 ‐3 85 10 0,789 Yes
Lindab International 60 5 ‐1 ‐4 59 1 0,967 No
Loomis 179 21 ‐32 ‐2 147 19 0,771 Yes
Lundbergföretagen 183 32 ‐19 ‐8 164 24 0,745 Yes
Lundin Petroleum 65 4 ‐10 ‐2 55 2 0,930 Yes
Meda 73 2 ‐4 1 69 3 0,917 Yes
Mekonomen  69 11 ‐9 3 60 14 0,622 Yes
Melker Schörling 47 3 ‐1 ‐1 46 2 0,917 Yes
Modern Times Group  94 2 ‐7 ‐1 87 1 0,977 Yes
Mycronic  62 8 ‐4 2 58 10 0,706 No
NCC 93 18 ‐5 ‐3 88 15 0,709 Yes
Net Entertainment  95 6 ‐2 ‐3 93 3 0,938 No
NIBE Industrier  94 6 ‐1 ‐2 93 4 0,918 Yes
Nobia  55 10 ‐6 0 49 10 0,661 Yes
Nordea  78 25 ‐6 0 72 25 0,485 No
Nordnet 52 4 ‐6 ‐3 46 1 0,957 Yes
Opus Group  54 3 1 ‐1 55 2 0,930 No
Peab  65 5 ‐10 ‐2 55 3 0,897 Yes
Ratos 75 21 ‐1 ‐4 74 17 0,626 Yes
Rezidor Hotel Group  63 5 ‐5 0 58 5 0,841 Yes
SAAB 83 15 ‐2 ‐3 81 12 0,742 Yes
Sagax 88 23 ‐8 ‐8 80 15 0,684 Yes
Sandvik 65 10 ‐1 ‐1 64 9 0,753 No
SAS 74 18 2 ‐8 76 10 0,767 No
SCA 104 9 ‐3 ‐4 101 5 0,906 No
SEB 46 7 ‐3 ‐2 43 5 0,792 Yes
Securitas 92 13 ‐8 ‐1 84 12 0,750 Yes
Skanska  84 12 ‐7 ‐3 77 9 0,791 No
SKF 81 18 2 ‐13 83 5 0,886 Yes
SSAB 67 22 ‐9 0 58 22 0,450 No
Sweco 42 2 0 ‐1 42 1 0,953 Yes
Swedbank 49 3 ‐1 0 48 3 0,882 No
Swedish Match 90 24 ‐4 ‐7 86 17 0,670 No
Swedish Orphan Biovitrum 58 3 ‐11 0 47 3 0,880 Yes
Systemair 43 8 ‐1 ‐3 42 5 0,787 Yes
Tele2 79 14 ‐1 ‐6 78 8 0,814 Yes
TeliaSonera  90 11 ‐8 ‐2 82 9 0,802 No
Tethys oil  53 3 ‐6 0 47 3 0,880 No
Thule Group 67 11 4 ‐8 71 3 0,919 No
Transmode  75 9 0 ‐2 75 7 0,829 No
Trelleborg 116 12 ‐3 ‐1 113 11 0,823 No
Unibet  80 5 ‐6 1 74 6 0,850 No
Wallenstam  91 15 ‐1 ‐5 90 10 0,800 Yes
Wihlborgs 56 8 ‐11 ‐2 45 6 0,765 No
Volvo 42 7 ‐7 1 35 8 0,628 No
ÅF 82 7 ‐5 ‐3 77 4 0,901 No
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Appendix 4: Full Descriptive List of the Sample   
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